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RESTITUTION-1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
MONEY PAID UNDER COMPULSION
Compulsion of Judgment: This year's most important decision in
the field of Restitution is the famous case of New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Nashville Trust Co.' This was the case in which one Buntin disap-
peared from his home in Nashville under circumstances which led the
Supreme Court of Tennessee to hold that he had committed suicide
and thus died while an insurance policy was still in effect.2 As a
result the plaintiff insurance company was compelled to pay the de-
fendant trust company, as trustees for the beneficiaries of the policy
(Buntin's family), an amount of $60,000. Years later, Buntin was
found alive in another state, and the insurance company sued to re-
cover the trust funds still held by the trustee. The suit was in chancery,
to establish a constructive trust.
Obviously, this provides a classic illustration of unjust enrichment,
as the trustees and the beneficiaries were not entitled to the insurance
money unless Buntin was dead. On the other hand, the defense was
res judicata-that the issues of fact had been settled by the court
between these same parties and could not now be relitigated since
the time for opening up the original suit had passed. The two legal
principles are both strong, vigorous, important ones, and they clash
here head-on. The extent of the clash in this case is indicated by the
fact that the Supreme Court divided, three to two, with each of the
five judges writing a separate opinion and one judge writing two
opinions. The court reversed the chancellor and held that the de-
fendant's demurrer to the complaint should have been overruled.
In this case, therefore, the policy underlying the principle of restitu-
tion3 prevailed, and the policy of providing justice between the parties
was given greater weight than the policy for laying litigation at rest
and insuring stability of judgments. It happens that a similar decision
was reached in Moses v. Macferlan,4 Lord Mansfield's famous decision
* Dean, Vanderbilt University Law School; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 292 S.W.2d 749 (Tenn. 1956), 10 VAND. L. REV. 868 (1957).
2. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nashville Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 437, 159
S.W.2d 81 (1942).
3. "A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
required to make restitution to the other." RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 1
(1937).
4. 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760). Macferlan had recovered in
the Court of Conscience on the indorsement on a note because Moses was not
permitted in that court to show a signed agreement by Macferlan "that Moses
should not be liable to the payment of the money." Moses was permitted to
recover the money back in King's Bench in an action of quasi contract for
money had and received.
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in 1760, which has been generally regarded as the real 'origin of quasi
contract and thus of restitution.5 Said Lord Mansfield in that case:
Money may be recovered by a right and legal judgment; and yet the
iniquity of keeping that money may be manifest, upon grounds which
could not be used by way of defence against the judgment.
.... Suppose a man recovers upon a policy for a ship presumed to be lost,
which afterwards comes home;-or upon the life of a man presumed to be
dead, who afterwards appears;-or upon a representation of a risque
deemed to be fair, which comes out afterwards to be grossly fraudulent.6
Since that time two changes have taken place. First, the action for
restitution is now brought in equity to establish a constructive trust (as
in the instant case), rather than at law in quasi contract. Second, the
concept of res judicata has become stronger. When the losing party
has had an opportunity for a fair trial, he is not ordinarily given equi-
table relief against the judgment even though it is "erroneous and
inequitable."
7
Yet there are cases where it is clearly so unjust to allow the winning
party to retain the fruits of an erroneous judgment that relief must
be given. A reconciliative is offered in the leading case of United
States v. Throckmorton,8 where a distinction is drawn between "ex-
trinsic" and "intrinsic" fraud. Extrinsic fraud is collateral to the trial
and prevents the losing party from fully presenting his case; relief
is granted when it is involved. Intrinsic fraud includes false evidence,
perjury or forged instruments and can be contested in the trial;
the decision here is res judicata and not subject to relief.
It was on this distinction that the judges divided in the Buntin
case. Following his "self-made surreptitious disappearance," Buntin
had "concocted" evidence "very cleverly simulating the occurrence
of suicide." The minority recognized this as fraud but likened it to
perjured testimony and concluded that as intrinsic fraud it did not
warrant equitable relief. The three judges in the majority concluded
that the fraud was either extrinsic or both intrinsic and extrinsic.
' It would appear that the majority opinions have somewhat obscured
or rendered fuzzy the distinction between the two types of fraud and
5. The most famous quotation from this case, which is still widely quoted,
reads-as follows: "This kind of equitable action, to recover back money,.which
ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore much en-
cQuraged. It lies only for money which, ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought
to refund, . . . it lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration. whioh
happens to fail; or for money got through imposition, (express, or implied);
or oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation,' con-
trary to laws made for the protection of persons under those circumstances.
In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the
circumstances of.the case, is obliged'by the ties of natural justice and equity
to refund the money." 97 Eng. Rep. at 680.
6. 97 Eng. Rep. at 679.
7. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 126 (1942).
8. 98 U.S. 61 (1878). , k
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that on a strictly conceptualistic basis the fraud involved here is more
pr6 perly to be regarded as the equivalent of false testimony and there-
fore classed as intrinsic. Yet my personal viewpoint is that the major-
ity reached the better result. The distinction has been criticized on
numerous occasions.9 It has not been adopted in England or in Wiscon-
sin610 Courts which purport to adopt it not infrequently engraft excep-
tions on it and sometimes themselves obscure its meaning in order to
accomplish justice between the parties." Obscuration may serve a
useful purpose in leaving leeway to a court to reach a particular hold-
ing without setting a "dangerous precedent." The Wisconsin position
of granting equitable relief from a judgment obtained by intrinsic
fraud but requiring a very high degree of proof also has ?much to be
said for it, and fifty years of experience with this rule show that it
has not opened up "Pandora's Box of troubles [by destroying] stability
of judgments."' 2
The unjust enrichment in the Buntin case was clear and undeniable,
with the facts unassailable. There was not involved here the trying
over of a fact issue with the chance that the court might be just as
likely to be wrong the second time as it was the first time. It seems that
Lord Mansfield's view of providing justice between the parties should
more frequently prevail over the strictly legal technicalities of res
judicata than it does now in many states. The Supreme Court showed
confidence in itself and its power of restraint in rendering this de-
cision,,and there is no reason to fear its inability to control application
of the principle involved when other cases arise. The Buntin case was
almost sui generis.
Majority and minority in the case differed on one other issue-the
statute of limitations. The majority held that the statute did not run
while Buntin's fraud was undiscovered; the minority argued that the
fraud of Buntin should not keep the statute from running in favor
of the defendants in this suit.
Compulsion of State Authority: In Roane-Anderson Co. v. Evans13
defendant, being required to pay certain gross receipts taxes, paid
under protest and sued to recover the money paid. It succeeded in
showing that the tax was not due and prevailed in its action.14 The
court declared: "Suffice it to say if Roane-Anderson Company is en-
9. See, e.g., Notes, 4 VAwD. L. REv. 338 (1951), 23 CALIF. L. REV. 79 (1934).
10. Note, 4 VAI. L. REv. 338, 340-41 (1951).
11. See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238
(1944), considered by both majority and minority opinions. For a collection
of cases on the subject, see Annot., 126 A.L.R. 390 (1940).
12. Judge Swepston in the instant case, 292 S.W.2d at 759.
13. 292 S.W.2d 398 (Tenn. 1956).
14. Practically all of the opinion was concerned with the question of whether
the taxes were properly assessed, the problem dealing with the exemption of
a contractor with the Federal Government. For a discussion of this part of
the case, see the article on Taxation, infra.
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titled to recover the sums of money paid under protest, it would in-
clude not only taxes illegally assessed, but interest and penalties
as well."'15
Compulsion of Contract Obligation: Sam Finley, Inc. v. Standard
Acc. Ins. Co.16 involves an action for contribution by one insurance
company against another, the plaintiff having been required to pay
under its policy. The court recognized the appropriateness of the
relief but found that the defendant company was not liable under its
policy and so was not liable to the plaintiff.
Braswell v. Tindall7 involved an action to recover usurious interest
paid. The court recognized again the appropriateness of restitution in
such a situation but was principally concerned with whether the de-
fendant was a holder in due course and therefore able to keep the
money.
REscIssIoN
Fraud: In Lowe v. Wright18 a real estate agent, with authority to
make a contract to sell property for complainants but without authority
to execute a deed, fraudulently entered into a contract to sell the land
to defendant and executed a deed to him. Defendant was led by false
statements to issue a cashier's check to complainants, and complain-
ants were led by other false statements to cash this check (for $8,900),
to take out certain money already owed them by Parrish and to give
Parrish a cashier's check for the remainder ($6,000). Discovering the
fraud and learning about the contract and deed to defendant, com-
plainants sued to cancel the deed and remove it as a cloud on their
title. The court cancelled the deed as a forgery and granted a
rescission of the contract of sale on the ground of fraud. The rescis-
sion was conditioned, however, on the repayment to defendant of the
$8,900. This would obviously have been required if complainants had
received the money. The court recognized that both parties were de-
frauded and fell back on the old maxim, "where one of two persons
must suffer loss by the acts or fraud of a third party, he who enabled
that third party to occasion the loss, or to commit the fraud, ought to
be the sufferer."' 9
Duress: Exum v. Washington Fire and Marine Ins. Co.20 involved
rescission of a release. Complainant had a fire insurance policy on his
automobile, which burned. The insurance company turned the claim
over to an adjustment company. Its employee accused complainant
15. 292 S.W.2d at 404.
16. 295 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
17. 294 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn. 1956).
18. 292 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
19. Id. at 419, quoting from GiBsoN, SUITS IN CHANCERY § 61 (5th ed., Croon-
over 1955).
20. 297 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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of burning the car himself and arranged to have a state fire marshal
get complainant from his place of work and take him to a downtown
office, where he was subjected to "an implied threat of prosecution
or public charge of arson"21 and induced to sign a release in return
for $132. Of this amount $1 was paid to complainant and $131 was paid
directly to the bank for the balance owed it on the car. The court found
that the release was not executed "as a free and voluntary act on the
part of the insured but as a result of duress and hence the release
should be considered void and of no effect."''22 The complainant's action
on the insurance policy was therefore permitted, and it was held that
he did not have to tender the $131 paid to the bank, because the insur-
ance company would have had to pay the bank in any event. In addi-
tion, the requirement of tender was not raised until the appeal and
this was held to be too late.
Breach of warranty: Henson v. Wright 23 repeats the holding of
several recent cases 24 that, under the provisions of the Uniform Sales
Act, rescission is one of the remedies available to a buyer for breach
of warranty.
BENEFITS BESTOWED
Murray v. Grissim5 involved an action for services rendered as
manager of defendant's farm. Plaintiff, a close friend of defendant's
father, had managed the father's farm without charge for six years
until the father's death. He had had no dealings with the son but
consented to continue managing the farm on the latter's request. After
eleven years he brought this action. Though no contract was spelled
out between the parties, the court held that the jury "could well find"
that plaintiff reasonably expected to be paid "the reasonable value of
such services," and that recovery could be had on an "implied contract
to make such payment." This was probably a contract implied in fact-
a true contract.26 The court appeared ready, however, if necessary, to
allow recovery on a contract implied in law-a quasi contract, or resti-
tutionary relief for the value of the enrichment received.27
21. Id. at 809.
22. Ibid.
23. 296 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
24. See Wade, Restitution-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1112,
1114 (1956).
25. 290 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
26. "While a contract (offer and acceptance) is usually expressed in words, it
may be implied from conduct. In such case the intention of the parties is a
matter of inference from their conduct. Any conduct by one from which the
other reasonably infers a promise in return for a requested act or promise
amounts to an offer." Id. at 890.
27. "From the mere rendering of such services by one and their acceptance
by another, the law, without regard to the other's intent, will ordinarily raise
a quasi contract on his part to pay the reasonable value of such services; or
the circumstances may warrant the triers of fact in finding an implied promise
or contract on his part to pay such value." Ibid.
1957] 1207
1208 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol;. i0
The court divided on the matter of the statute of limitations. The
majority held that this was a continuous contract involving entire per-
formance, so that the statute would not begin to run until the services
had been completed or terminated. The dissent urged that recovery
could be had only for the last six years rather than the whole eleven.
State v. O'Brien28 involved an action by the state against the estate
of a decedent paid under the old age assistance law. This was under
a provision of a former statute no longer in existence.29 The court
held that the statute of limitations would not run here against the state.
28. 292 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1956).
29. TENN. CODE § 4765.29 (Supp. 1950).
